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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

RIGHTS AS A FUNCTIONAL GUIDE FOR SERVICE PROVISION IN
HOMELESS ADVOCACY

NESTOR M. DAVIDSON*
Rights-based approaches to advocacy on behalf of homeless persons have
long sought to vindicate important dignitary, liberty, and equality interests, as
well as establish to entitlements to housing, mental health, substance abuse,
and other services. This advocacy has had some success in shaping the
systems that define the interaction between homeless persons and the state.
Rights paradigms, however, can be undermined by the day-to-day reality of the
lives of homeless individuals and families that are often shaped by profound
need less for protection from the state than for meaningful support, and
entitlement advocacy remains circumscribed by the reality of severely limited
resources at all levels of government.
Given these constraints, this essay argues that rights at the center of
homeless advocacy can serve an additional function. The values underlying
core rights asserted on behalf of those without shelter can provide a functional
tool for providers of services to homeless individuals and families. Deploying
rights in this way would serve less to hone an adversarial relationship between
clients and service providers, and more as a set of guiding principles for
program design and implementation. This essay accordingly argues that a
self-conscious rights advocacy can help shape the systems that support
homeless individuals and families, outlining core norms that advocates have
asserted on the front lines of fighting for the rights of homeless persons and
demonstrating how this is working in practice through examples from recent
important developments in the field.
INTRODUCTION
As homelessness has remained a significant national concern over the past
quarter century, advocates have taken a vital role in asserting the individual
rights of those without shelter. Resisting moves by many communities to
criminalize homelessness, advocates have fought to protect a variety of
important rights, including access to public facilities, freedom of movement,

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. The author wishes to thank Deborah
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excellent research assistance.
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and the right to attend to daily life functions where no adequate alternatives
exist. Recognizing that the day-to-day lives of most of those facing
homelessness are defined less by an overriding need for protection from a
hostile state and more by a profound need for assistance, moreover, advocates
have also worked to establish entitlements to housing, mental health, substance
abuse, and other services.
Although this advocacy has had mixed success, it has done much to keep
homelessness from descending into a nameless, faceless problem rather than a
crisis of individuals who deserve protection from often remorseless efforts to
marginalize them. The reality remains, however, that even as the current
movement to end chronic homelessness garners increasing support, resources
available at all levels of government remain woefully inadequate, and our legal
and political culture is increasingly resistant to the idea of entitlements.
Individual rights, however, can play an additional and underappreciated
role for advocates. Underlying core rights asserted on behalf of homeless
persons are norms of dignity, autonomy, liberty, opportunity, and equality that
have quite practical consequences if taken seriously in the design and
implementation of services for homeless individuals and families. Service
providers appropriately tend to focus on pragmatic goals—serving the greatest
number of recipients in the most cost-effective and (for relevant clients)
clinically appropriate manner. Norms underlying rights-based advocacy on
behalf of the homeless, however, are directly relevant to how services are
provided. Viewing rights-based norms as a functional tool for service
providers would serve less to hone an adversarial relationship between clients
and service providers and more as practical, client-oriented program guidance.
It is thus possible to design and operate emergency shelters, transitional
housing, permanent supportive housing, and the myriad of other services for
those facing homelessness in ways that, even if not necessarily translating into
legally enforceable rights, nonetheless seek to advance the dignity and
autonomy of those served.
Many service providers are moving toward approaches that fulfill this
rights-vindicating function. Although not typically described this way, a
rights-as-functional-guide perspective can be seen in a number of recent
significant developments in the field. A confluence of practical approaches to
service provisions with an internalization of client-centered norms that parallel
rights asserted on behalf of homeless individuals is evident in developments
such as the rise of the “Housing First” movement and the trend toward
permanent supportive housing; the increasing emphasis on short-circuiting the
institutional cycle of placements facilitated by discharging clients from the
health-care and the criminal-justice systems to the streets; creative new
approaches to outreach; and, care for individuals with disabilities in less-
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restrictive settings following the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead
v. L.C. 1
This brief essay seeks to make two points. First, advocacy has a
significant role to play not just in protecting individual rights and securing
resources, but also in directly shaping how services are provided to those
experiencing or at risk of experiencing homelessness. Second, in approaching
that task, advocates can draw on norms honed over many years of fighting for
individual rights and for entitlements—norms that provide concrete, clientcentered guidance for program design and implementation. In the current
political climate, particularly at the local level where homeless persons and the
government interact most directly, the need for individual advocacy is unlikely
to abate. An active engagement in the systems that have emerged and are still
developing to serve those without shelter, however, provides an additional
fruitful avenue to help individuals and families most effectively find
permanent housing.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS IN HOMELESS ADVOCACY
Advocacy on behalf of the homeless has taken on a number of distinct
aspects since homelessness re-emerged as a fixture of national public concern
in the early 1980s, focusing broadly on securing resources and challenging
increasing moves to criminalize homelessness. 2 This long struggle has met
with mixed success, but this advocacy has produced a set of particularized
norms that can provide robust guidance for serving those without shelter.
A.

The Daily Lives of Homeless Individuals and the Circuit of Services

Best estimates suggest that roughly a million and a half to over three
million individuals experience homelessness over the course of a year. 3 The
experience of being without shelter, however, is only the most visible

1. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). See infra text accompanying notes 87-96 for a
description of Olmstead and its ramifications.
2. See generally Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and
Directions for the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215 (2003); Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness
and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Strategy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 329
(2000) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy]; Wes Daniels, “Derelicts,” Recurring
Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants
and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 691-695 (1997). Homelessness has
been a fixture of American life since the colonial era, with periods of more intense public policy
focus, such as the 1870s and the Great Depression, alternating with periods of less national
visibility. See generally KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN & OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2002).
3. See MARTHA BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS: EMERGENCY SHELTER OR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 48-50 (2001) [hereinafter BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S
HOMELESS].
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manifestation of a complex of structural and individual problems that involve
economic dislocation and poverty, as well as the effects of mental illness,
substance abuse, and the interaction of these challenges. 4 It is important in
discussing homelessness to be sensitive not just to what unites various
populations facing homelessness, but also to what distinguishes them. 5
Over the past five years, the federal government has focused intensely, and
not without controversy, on “chronic” homelessness. 6 The federal government
defines someone as chronically homeless if that person is an “unaccompanied
homeless individual with a disabling condition who has either been
continuously homeless for a year or more, or has had at least four episodes of
homelessness in the past three years.” 7 While a small fraction of the overall
population of those experiencing homelessness, the chronically homeless
appear to be a relatively static population 8 (and therefore amenable to targeted
assistance), require disproportionate resources, and tend to drive public
perceptions of the problem. 9
For many chronically homeless individuals, daily life involves a circuit of
services provided in a variety of institutional settings. 10 This circuit often
4. See Rob Rosenthal & Maria Foscarinis, Responses to Homelessness: Past Policies,
Future Directions, and a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW
SOCIAL AGENDA 317, 317-319 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006); Christina Paul, Putting
Homelessness into Context, 12 J. AFF. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 378 (2003).
5. See generally BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 161-185
(documenting varying patterns of homelessness).
6. See generally Martha R. Burt, Chronic Homelessness: Emergence of a Public Policy, 30
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1267 (2003) [hereinafter Burt, Chronic Homelessness]. Some advocates
have raised concerns that the current focus on chronic homelessness represents a divide-andignore strategy, whereby the most visible homeless individuals receive public attention and
resources while the needs of the bulk of those without shelter go unmet. See Nestor M. Davidson,
“Housing First” for the Chronically Homeless: Challenges of a New Service Model, 15 J. AFF.
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 125, 126-127 n.14 (2006).
7. 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (2006). Under the McKinney-Vento Act, by contrast, a person is
considered homeless if they lack “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence,” or if their
“primary nighttime residence” is a shelter or “a public or private place not designed for, or
ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.” 42 U.S.C. §
11302(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
8. See Judith Hahn et al., The Aging of the Homeless Population: Fourteen-Year Trends in
San Francisco, 21 J. OF GEN. INT. MED. 775, 775-778 (2006) (reporting on a study that indicates
that the literally homeless population in San Francisco appears to be a static and aging cohort).
9. Public perception of the “homeless” and the political and legal responses that flow from
that perceptions have been their own arena of advocacy. Gary Blasi has argued persuasively that
prevailing cultural perceptions of homelessness are shaped by stereotypes and associations some
of which can be attributed to the lasting results of advocates who took the lead decades ago in
defining the problem. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to
Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 233 (2000).
10. See Kim Hopper et al., Homelessness, Severe Mental Illness, and the Institutional
Circuit, 48 PSYCH. SERV. 659, 662 (1997) [hereinafter Hopper, Institutional Circuit]; see also
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involves a rotating combination of institutional settings, a hobbled-together
succession of shelters, rehabilitation facilities, hospital emergency rooms, jails,
informal arrangements, and, of course, the streets. 11 For those for whom
homelessness reflects more of a structural economic problem and often a
shorter-term experience, the network of available services is fragmented and
disconnected. 12 The result of this fragmented system of services is that for
both the chronically homeless and for those experiencing homelessness on a
more short-term basis, the experience of being without shelter involves
significant dislocations.
B.

Swords and Shields in the Rights of the Homeless

The homelessness crisis of the past two decades has spawned waves of
advocacy. Somewhat artificially divided, cycles of homeless advocacy have
focused on immediate shelter needs, securing more permanent resources, and,
increasingly, on individual rights in the face of attempts to criminalize
homelessness. 13
Advocates responded to the homelessness crisis initially by focusing on the
dearth of emergency shelter beds, and were largely successful in securing
national, state and local resources to form a minimal safety net. 14 Recognizing

KIM HOPPER, RECKONING WITH HOMELESSNESS 135-143 (2003) (describing an ethnographic
study of the use of public spaces by homeless individuals).
11. See Hopper, Institutional Circuit, supra note 10, at 663; Sidney D. Watson, Discharges
to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 357, 358 (2000);
Stephen Metraux & Dennis P. Culhane, Recent Incarceration History Among a Sheltered
Homeless Population, 52 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 504, 507-510 (2006); see also MARTHA BURT
ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CHRONIC STREET HOMELESSNESS: FINAL REPORT (2004),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/ChronicStrtHomeless.pdf [hereinafter
BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES]. Malcolm Gladwell recently chronicled one example of this cycle in
his portrait of Murray Barr, a homeless man in Reno, Nevada who suffered from alcoholism.
Barr cycled in and out of the local jail and emergency rooms, often several times a week. See
Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13 & 20, 2006, at 96-97.
12. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 41-49 (discussing the multiplicity of
service providers). Robert Solomon has described his experience with conflicts over funding and
programmatic control that flow from how the “homeless” are defined. See Robert A. Solomon,
Representing the Poor and Homeless: A Community-Based Approach, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 475, 479 (2000). Solomon recounts his mystification with an intense debate between two
legal services attorneys over “whether homelessness was an ‘entitlements problem’ or a ‘housing
problem.’” Id. What he later came to understand was this was in no sense an academic issue:
how the problem was defined determined which agency funded services and accordingly how the
needs of the clients would be served. Id. This kind of service fragmentation and resulting
conflict over turf is unfortunately all too common.
13. As Maria Foscarinis has noted, legal advocates have employed numerous strategies
modulating between litigation and legislative and regulatory advocacy, substantively focusing on
both immediate and long-term needs. See Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy, supra note 2, at 329.
14. See BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 12, 93.
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the limits of emergency shelters, advocates over the past three decades have
engaged in a sustained effort to establish legally enforceable entitlements to
services. 15 Despite a legal culture increasingly inimical to positive rights,
advocates have argued for rights to emergency shelter 16 as well as housing
more generally. 17 Given the dearth of federal constitutional support, advocates
have creatively drawn on state statutory and constitutional rights, 18 and even
international human rights law. 19 Advocates have likewise sought to establish
entitlements to other services necessary for homeless individuals and families,
such as securing important rights to education for children facing
homelessness 20 and mental health and substance abuse services.
This entitlement focus is evident to an extent in advocacy for procedural
rights in social welfare programs that intersect with homeless populations. 21
Advocates have sought to ensure that clients are not erroneously deprived of
benefits to which they are entitled, whether in terms of welfare, Social Security
benefits, food stamps, or other general public benefits. 22 Advocates have also
focused on employment 23 as well as other avenues of economic selfsufficiency. 24 Advocates have likewise worked for systemic and political-level
change, shaping the national dialogue about homelessness, 25 as well as
defending political rights. 26
Civil rights law, moreover, has taken a central, if at times contradictory,
role in the system of services for homeless persons, increasingly with respect

15. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 319-320.
16. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1231-1232.
17. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 317-318.
18. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1232-1233; see also Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do
Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due Process, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1413, 1437-1433 (2006).
19. See Foscarinis, Integrated Strategy, supra note 2, at 327-328.
20. See McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (2000).
21. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1248-1254.
22. See id.
23. See generally Lucie White, On Abolitionist Critiques, “Homeless Service” Programs,
and Pragmatic Change, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 431 (2000).
24. See generally Susan R. Jones, Representing the Poor and Homeless: Innovations in
Advocacy, Tackling Homelessness through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 385 (2000) (discussing microenterprise as a tool of homeless advocacy).
25. See Blasi, supra note 9, at 207-210; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lawyer as
Abolitionist: Ending Homelessness and Poverty in Our Time, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 237
(2000). The movement to end chronic homelessness, for example, can be traced to the work of
the National Alliance to End Homelessness. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at
xiii.
26. See Tulin Ozdeger & Jewel Baltimore, Homeless but Not Voiceless: Protecting the
Voting Rights of Homeless Persons, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313 (2006).
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to individuals with disabilities. 27 The deinstitutionalization movement, and
more recently, advocacy for less-restrictive institutional placements under
Olmstead, 28 are predicated on norms of equality and individual dignity.
Beyond the focus on securing shelter and entitlements to services,
advocates have played a growing role in seeking protection for homeless
persons from hostile local communities. Faced with the persistence of
homelessness, local communities are increasingly utilizing criminal law to
penalize activities associated with homelessness. 29 This “criminalization” of
homelessness involves restrictions on the use of public places, anti-camping
ordinances, restrictions on the location of homeless persons, 30 prohibitions
against begging, 31 as well as broad efforts to punish the status of homelessness
itself. 32 Criminalization also involves the revival and selective enforcement of
provisions such as open container or loitering laws and sweeps of areas where
homeless individuals are living. 33
Advocates have had mixed success in fighting this trend. They have
challenged sanctions connected to unavoidable aspects of homeless life as
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. 34 This approach builds on a pair of Warren-Court-era Supreme
Court cases—Robinson v. California 35 and Powell v. Texas 36—that together
have come to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment limits a

27. See generally Henry Korman, Clash of the Integrationists: The Mismatch of Civil Rights
Imperatives in Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3
(2007).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 87-96.
29. See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Downward Spiral]; NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS AND THE NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND
POVERTY, A DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 8 (2006)
[hereinafter A DREAM DENIED], available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/
crimreport/report.pdf; see also Benno Weisberg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the
Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual
“Crimes,” 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 330-331, 356-357 (2005).
30. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 16-18; see also Justin Cook,
Comment, Down and Out in San Antonio: The Constitutionality of San Antonio’s Anti-Homeless
Ordinances, 8 SCHOLAR 221, 223-224 (2006) (discussing one local example of a package of
ordinances prohibiting sitting, lying down, or camping in public places, “aggressive solicitation,”
and urinating and defecating in public).
31. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 20-21.
32. See Weisberg, supra note 29, at 346-356 (discussing cases involving status crimes and
homelessness).
33. See A DREAM DENIED, supra note 29, at 9.
34. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 38-43; Weisberg, supra note 29, at
346-356.
35. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
36. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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state’s ability to criminalize “status” as opposed to “acts.” 37 In a series of
cases, advocates have asserted the Robinson doctrine to argue that
homelessness and many aspects of life associated with homelessness represent
a status that cannot be criminalized. 38 Few courts have been willing to adopt a
wholesale Eighth Amendment limitation on restrictions affecting homeless
persons. 39 Other theories for resisting the criminalization of homelessness
have included the right to travel 40 as well as First Amendment and Equal
Protection challenges to anti-begging statutes. 41
C. Rights, the Need for Support, and the Limits of Political Will
Rights-based advocacy, whether in securing resources or in resisting
criminalization, faces inherent limitations. In the individual-rights context,
advocacy risks reinforcing an adversarial relationship between homeless
individuals and those institutions that can at least potentially be a part of the
solution. That this risk arises from the inevitably defensive posture that rights
advocates find themselves in makes it no less salient in considering the
unintended consequences of an approach designed to ensure some space
between official hostility and the reality of life on the streets. Securing this
negative liberty is critical where resources are unavailable to provide
meaningful alternatives—a situation that is true in communities throughout the
country. What is secured is nonetheless still freedom to go about daily life
under extremely marginalized conditions. 42
Resource advocacy recognizes that what is needed for many, if not most,
homeless persons is less protection than support from the state. Advocacy can
change local and national political dynamics, but the resources devoted to all
aspects of homelessness are far outweighed by the magnitude of the need. 43
The question then becomes how best to use the resources that are available. Is
there a role for advocacy in shaping how programs are designed and operated?

37. See Weisberg, supra note 29, at 338-341. Weisberg notes the on-going debate in the
lower courts about whether Robinson and Powell reaches “status” crimes that involve acts beyond
the volition of the actor, a doctrinal step further than the prevailing “act/status” interpretation. Id.
38. See id. at 331 n.12 (collecting cases).
39. Some courts that have rejected Eighth Amendment challenges have allowed a necessity
defense on the premise that even if what is being criminalized is an act, not a status, that act may
for some homeless persons be necessary to avoid some larger harm. See Antonia K. Fasanelli,
Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the
Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 345-346 (2000).
40. See Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, supra note 29, at 43-48.
41. See id. at 27-34.
42. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The “No Property” Problem: Understanding Poverty by
Understanding Wealth, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1022-1023 (2004).
43. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 319-322.
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II. RIGHTS AS A FUNCTIONAL GUIDE FOR SERVICE PROVISION
Norms that advocates have spent the better part of the past quarter century
honing to guide the relationship between the state and the homeless can serve
an additional function. These norms can provide a practical tool through
which the needs of homeless persons can be placed at the center of the
fractured web of services that define so much of the day-to-day lives of those
without shelter.
A.

Alternative Accounts of the Role of Rights

Rights can serve functions other than shielding individuals and securing
resources from the state. The clash of rights at the heart of the adversarial
system is generally touted not just for its protection of individuals, but also for
advantages that such adversarial clashes can bring to the institutions
involved. 44 Decisions are thus not only more fair in some abstract sense, but
may also be more accurate and the result of better information. 45 In the
modern bureaucratic state, rights similarly serve an accountability function,
ensuring that those most affected by the government’s decisions have a role to
play in the substantive outcome of those decisions. 46
Individual rights are often seen as a cost to the government—a necessary,
if at times grudging concession, that nonetheless undermine the effective
functioning of public entities. Adversarial approaches, moreover, are also
most relevant where the interests of clients are truly marginalized. Rightsbased approaches risk myopically focusing on crisis and not on the underlying
experience of those in need of support. 47
As David Super has argued, however, rights can serve to improve the
efficiency and operation of social welfare programs. Super focuses on the
potential of rights to operate as a ground-level, client-initiated auditing
function, allowing recipients to provide a counterbalance to incentives that
providers face not to be overly generous with public benefits. 48 A managerial
view of individual rights—that rights can shape the day-to-day manner in
which services are provided—points toward an additional role for advocates in
responding to homelessness. Rights reflect a judicial, legislative or regulatory
response to certain underlying values. Rights in an adversarial system ensure
that decision-makers give adequate weight to those values regardless of
political or practical incentives to ignore them. Jonathan Hafetz has argued for

44. See David Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1063-1067 (2005).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 1070.
47. Cf. Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006).
48. See Super, supra note 44, at 1129-1135.
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overcoming the disconnect between legal advocacy and service provision. 49
Recognizing that what homeless individuals and families need most is support,
Hafetz has argued that legal advocacy is too often disconnected from clients’
needs for support. This argument is right, but limited. In the structure of legal
advocacy lies a set of tools through which advocates can advance the
individual interests of clients by engaging directly with providers and policy
makers in shaping the design and day-to-day implementation of services.
B.

The Functional Value of Rights for Service Provision

Returning to the variety of tools that advocates have honed in fighting for
the rights of homeless persons, it is possible to discern clear underlying values.
The rhetoric of rights in advocacy for the homeless manifests concern for
dignity, liberty, and equality. These norms have evolved, even when the
specific legal challenges have not succeeded, as concrete manifestations of the
interests of the most vulnerable and vilified segments of the population.
How might these values serve as practical guidance in program design and
implementation? Currently, service providers naturally turn to a variety of
sources in creating programs. In crisis situations, immediate need drives
services. The initial wave of shelter-oriented responses to homelessness shows
the inevitability of this kind of practical experimentation and its obvious
limitations. In designing longer-term solutions, research-based approaches
draw on the hard work of social scientists, psychiatrists, substance abuse
experts, and others. 50 Political reality is also a powerful force. The political
salience of focusing on narratives of family homelessness over individuals, for
example, can shape programs with greater force at times than ground-level
reality. 51
Viewing persons without shelter as rights-bearing individuals can thus
have a direct bearing on programs that serve them. Consider the liberty and
autonomy interests underlying Eighth Amendment and First Amendment
claims. On one level, these claims serve the narrow—if critical—function of
protecting homeless persons from overreaching state restrictions, particularly
where no alternatives for daily living exist. On a slightly higher level of
abstraction, however, such claims also serve as a profound recognition of the
value of individual choice and autonomy. In other words, the movement to
resist the criminalization of homelessness represents a concrete legal defense
49. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1247-1257.
50. See SUSAN WELLS ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: ENDING CHRONIC
HOMELESSNESS FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES AND/OR CO-OCCURRING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS 59-79 (2003) [hereinafter WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR
CHANGE] (discussing evidence-based and promising practices), available at http://download.
ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/SMA04-3870/SMA04-3870.pdf.
51. Cf. Blasi, supra note 9.
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against concerted efforts to dehumanize those living on the streets. The
act/status debate in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of homelessness asks
fundamental questions about whether homeless individuals share the same
ability to exist in public space, to meet basic needs, and to go about daily life
as those with shelter. Courts have been hesitant to reach too far in judicially
protecting those rights against assertions of deviance from community norms,
but advocates have resisted the loss of individualization and choice that the
criminalization movement embodies.
Similarly, while procedural rights primarily vindicate individual
entitlements, the individual dignitary interests they serve suggest that service
providers themselves can involve consumers. And however contested equality
norms may be in practice, 52 they represent a concrete commitment to
individual distinctiveness, substantive fairness, and, under Olmstead,
integration over isolation. 53 In short, the panoply of norms that advocates have
developed in fighting for the rights of homeless individuals can be applied to
services for homeless individuals. Advocates can thus work with service
providers to translate abstract values into program-specific approaches that
further such rights, albeit from a perspective less grounded in enforceability
than advocates may have traditionally approached provider-client relations.
This is not an argument for any specific mix or type of services, but rather
for a new conversation within existing service structures, recognizing that such
structures constantly evolve and adapt generally with an eye toward clinical
and other practical outcomes. The mode of advocacy explored in this essay
would not displace those primary concerns, but would mediate them through a
rights-filter that privileges consumer choice, autonomy, and equality. 54 To see
how this might work in practice—to move from the abstract to the concrete—it
is possible to discern a nascent rights-as-functional-guide approach in several
important developments in the field.
III. MODELING THE RIGHTS-AS-GUIDE FUNCTION
A number of current developments in the arena of responses to
homelessness evince a confluence between clinical and practical goals and

52. See Korman, supra note 27, at 6.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 87-96.
54. Cf. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 886-887 (1990) (“Those who have been diagnosed as different, as disabled,
must assume the power to describe their own circumstances, discover their own ‘capacities,’ and
define their own ‘needs.’ The society must free them to locate safe social spaces where they can
explore their injuries, feel their own fluency, and recast their ‘difference’ as the very ground of
their power.”).
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sensitivity to individual rights. 55 Recognizing this underlying pattern can
provide a template for advocates to engage with service providers and build on
the promise of these approaches. 56
A.

Permanent Supportive Housing and the “Housing First” Movement

A central aspect of the contemporary push to end chronic homelessness is
the increasingly widespread adoption of a service model called “Housing
First.” 57 With respect to individuals with mental illness, substance abuse, and
dual or multiple diagnoses, 58 Housing First reverses a long-standing practice of
conditioning increasingly permanent housing placements on compliance with
treatment plans and other clinical requirements. 59 Housing First instead offers
chronically homeless individuals permanent housing and then follows such
placement with intensive services. These services are typically provided
through an Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”) model of multiple
service providers focusing together on individual clients. 60 Central to the
approach is a harm-reduction philosophy that makes available, but does not
mandate, substance abuse, mental illness, or other treatment. 61
Complementing this harm-reduction approach, Housing First also emphasizes

55. See BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA’S HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 267-302, for a
thorough overview of program structures and approaches in services for homeless individuals and
families.
56. It is important to preface this discussion with a note of caution and clarification. These
examples largely focus on services for chronically homeless individuals as currently defined. See
supra text accompanying note 7. This is not to deny the centrality of housing as such to
preventing and responding to homelessness. See Rosenthal & Foscarinis, supra note 4, at 326.
Advocates have and can continue to play a role in the creative implementation of federal, state,
and local housing programs. This essay, however, focuses on services beyond shelter (temporary
or permanent) itself.
57. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 127. Housing First is part of a larger policy emphasis on
permanent supportive housing as a response to homelessness particularly for individuals with
disabilities or others who need on-going services. See generally YIN-LING IRENE WONG ET AL.,
PREDICTING STAYING IN OR LEAVING PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING THAT SERVES
HOMELESS PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS vii-ix (HUD ed., 2006), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/permhsgstudy.pdf (discussing the evolution of policy
toward permanent supportive housing).
58. Housing First is also used to describe approaches to family homelessness, where it takes
on a similar approach, albeit focused on the needs of families in crisis. E-mail from Ryan MacyHurley, Institute Coordinator, Institute for Research, Training, and Technical Assistance, Beyond
Shelter, Inc., to Nestor Davidson, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School (Nov.
17, 2006) (on file with author).
59. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 128.
60. See id. at 127-28.
61. See id. at 128; BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 27-28; see also WELLS ET
AL., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 50, at 73-74 (discussing low-demand services).
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a consumer focus that gives primacy to a client’s own determination of
needs. 62
A striking aspect of the rhetoric surrounding the Housing First movement
is its emphasis on a “right” to housing in framing the permanency of the shelter
offered to homeless persons. 63 To legal advocates, the “permanent” nature of
the housing provided in most Housing First programs would look less like an
entitlement and more like a rhetorical commitment. When Housing First
providers talk about a right to housing, they are really advancing the concept
that there is clinical and practical value in signaling to clients that the shelter
being provided is not fragile, fleeting, or transitory. At a cultural moment
when conceptions of home have taken on increasingly strident political valence
in response to perceptions that local governments are abusing the power of
eminent domain, 64 the value of this rhetoric cannot be discounted. The “right”
to housing asserted by some Housing First providers, however, is largely
rooted in an evaluation of the clinical and practical advantages that long-term
placements can provide. 65 Advancing stability and facilitating the ACT model
by ensuring that service teams have ready access to clients thus dovetail with
the deep-seeded impulse for stability, inclusion, and individual dignity that a
“right” to housing represents.
The confluence of individual rights and clinical concerns also informs the
harm-reduction aspect of Housing First. 66 The increasing recognition that
there are clinical benefits to less coercive approaches to substance abuse
services translates norms of individual dignity into radically new program
designs. Mental-health and substance-abuse professionals have recognized
that for clinical reasons, individuals who are unable to limit substance abuse as

62. See Ronni Michelle Greenwood et al., Decreasing Psychiatric Symptoms by Increasing
Choice in Services for Adults with Histories of Homelessness, 36 AM. J. OF COMM. PSYCH. 223,
225 (2005); Sam Tsemberis & Ronda Eisenberg, Pathways to Housing: Supported Housing for
Street-Dwelling Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities, 51 PSYCH. SERV. 487, 48889 (2000).
63. See, e.g., Tsemberis & Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 488 (discussing a leading Housing
First program as having been “[f]ounded on the belief that housing is a basic human right for all
individuals, regardless of disability”).
64. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005),
spawned a national outcry over so-called eminent domain abuse and legislation at the national
and state level to restrict eminent domain for economic development. At the center of this
political reaction is veneration for the home, a theme in American law with deep roots and
significant contemporary cultural resonance. See generally D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a
Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006).
65. See, e.g., Leyla Gulcur et al., Housing, Hospitalization, and Cost Outcomes for
Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities Participating in Continuum of Care and
Housing First Programmes, 13 J. COMM. APPL. SOC. PSYCH. 171, 177-83 (2003) (discussing the
comparative benefits of the Housing First model of service provision).
66. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 27.
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a condition of receiving housing may nonetheless be able to manage and
reduce substance use without the threat of program termination. 67 This
parallels the norms of individual dignity involved in Eighth Amendment and
other advocacy.
Likewise, emphasizing consumer choice has clear benefits in terms of
individual outcomes and program effectiveness. The consumer-choice aspect
of Housing First evinces mental-health and housing-retention benefits in
treating clients as empowered decision makers and not passive recipients of
assistance. 68 This not only parallels client-centered models of advocacy, 69 but
embodies norms of individual choice.
B.

Short-Circuiting the Institutional Cycle: Focusing on Discharge Planning

Another important development in service provision for homeless
individuals is an increasing focus on moments of transition in the institutional
cycle that many homeless persons experience. 70 If many homeless persons
hobble together an intermittent chain of institutional placements in between
stints on the streets, 71 that chain is often abetted by the failure of the
institutions that interface with homeless individuals to plan or sufficiently
account for what happens to clients after discharge. Sydney Watson has noted,
for example, that treatment facilities, state psychiatric hospitals, detoxification
programs and similar institutions often discharge clients literally to the streets
or give to-be-released patients names and addresses of shelters. 72 The lack of
discharge planning likewise plays a critical role in homelessness for
individuals transitioning out of incarceration. 73
Accordingly, discharge planning is coming to the fore as a critical tool to
short-circuit the institutional cycle. 74 To short-circuit the cycle of placements,
discharge planning focuses on community-based efforts to connect those

67. See id.
68. See Greenwood et al., supra note 62, at 225, 235-236.
69. See Hafetz, supra note 2, at 1241-45.
70. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing the importance of
“effective discharge planning from the many institutions that interface with chronically homeless
people and those at risk of chronic homelessness: hospitals, treatment facilities, psychiatric
institutions, correctional facilities, and sometimes foster care”).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
72. See Watson, supra note 11, at 362-63.
73. See Metraux & Culhane, supra note 11, at 514-15; Caterina Gouvis Roman & Jeremy
Travis, Where Will I Sleep Tomorrow? Housing, Homelessness and the Returning Prisoner, 17
HOUS. POL’Y DEB. 389 (2006).
74. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31; Watson, supra note 11, at 372-373.
Some courts have held that discharge-planning statutes for health-care facilities preclude
discharging clients to shelters. See id. at 377-84.
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experiencing homelessness or at risk of homelessness with appropriate
resources. 75 Effective discharge planning also focuses on individual choice. 76
This focus on the risks inherent in moments of transition for homeless
persons and those at risk for homelessness reflects norms of individual care
and the reality of the vulnerability of those who rely on institutional support.
The most innovative discharge planning efforts have been client-driven and
highly particularized, bridging service gaps and ensuring appropriate follow
through. 77 This kind of individualization and concern for vulnerability can
vindicate advocates’ emphasis on resisting the transmutation of homeless
persons into alien presences so evident in efforts to secure resources and resist
criminalization.
C. Reconceiving Outreach
Outreach plays a critical role in making initial contact and maintaining
contact with individuals living on the streets, providing a link to other facets of
the system of services. 78 Service providers are accordingly paying increasing
attention to the design of outreach approaches. The Choices Unlimited drop-in
center, for example, provides a consumer-choice model of outreach. 79 In this
model, clients determine the sequence of services, and continuity is facilitated
by retaining the same case manager as a client moves through program
stages. 80 The Choices Unlimited program has put this approach into operation
through outreach, a drop-in center, respite housing, and coordination on
follow-up services. 81 The emphasis throughout is on consumer participation
and direction, giving direct voice to recipients of services—a focus that makes
it more likely that homeless individuals will avail themselves of the services
and reduce their contact with institutional placements and the streets, among
other positive outcomes. 82 Similar innovative outreach efforts have included
coordinated outreach centers that field teams from several agencies, provide

75.
76.
77.
78.

See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 31.
See Watson, supra note 11, at 373-74.
See id. at 374-76.
See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 20; WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR
CHANGE, supra note 50, at 60-61.
79. See Sam J. Tsemberis et al., Consumer Preference Programs for Individuals Who Are
Homeless and Have Psychiatric Disabilities: A Drop-In Center and a Supported Housing
Program, 32 AM. J. OF COMM. PSYCH. 305, 307 (2003).
80. Id. at 307-308.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 308 (noting the results of a comparative study that showed that consumer-focused
outreach lead to greater participation in services, less contact with the criminal justice system,
improvements in life satisfaction for clients, and reduced time on the streets).
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twenty-four hour service referrals, and collect data. 83 A consistent element of
successful outreach has been a connection to permanent housing options. 84
What unites these innovative approaches to outreach is the pragmatic
recognition that the most effective approach to engaging those literally living
on the streets with services requires planning, coordination, and responsiveness
to individual circumstances. This focus on consumer choice vindicates aspects
of individual-rights advocacy that have highlighted the importance of allowing
those without shelter to attend to the necessities of daily life without undue
interference. 85 A recent report for the federal Department of Health and
Human Services on chronic homelessness for persons with mental illness and
substance abuse disorders identifies values of choice, voice, empowerment,
dignity and respect, and hope as essential to successful recovery from
homelessness. 86 These core values parallel in many respect the norms
advocates have asserted on behalf of homeless individuals.
D. Olmstead and Deinstitutionalization
In Olmstead v. L.C., 87 the Supreme Court held that the public services
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act 88 imposed a form of a lessrestrictive-setting obligation on states providing services to individuals with
disabilities. 89 Olmstead requires states to provide community-based treatment
for persons with mental disabilities when such placement is appropriate, not
opposed by the recipient, and can be reasonably accommodated, taking into
account the resources available to the state and the needs of others with mental
disabilities. 90 Olmstead, with its sweeping language about the harms that
segregation causes for individuals with disabilities, has become one of those
decisions that transcends the context in which it arises to become a cultural
symbol. 91 The decision has had significant practical implications as well, as
83. See BURT ET AL., STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 20-23.
84. Id. at 23.
85. See WELLS ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 50, at 29-30.
86. Id.
87. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
88. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
89. Olmstead involved a suit by two mentally retarded women, one of whom had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the other with a personality disorder. 527 U.S. at 593-594.
The women were institutionalized in a Georgia psychiatric hospital despite clinical assessments
that they could be treated appropriately in community-based settings. Id. Attorneys from Atlanta
Legal Aid filed suit on their behalf, asserting that the failure to place these women in community
programs violated Title II of the ADA. Id.; see also Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v.
Board of Education for Disability Rights: Promises, Limits, and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47,
49-50 (2001).
90. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
91. See generally Cerreto, supra note 89; Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo,
Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits After
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advocates have rallied around Olmstead’s endorsement of integration as a
practical tool for galvanizing providers of services for those with mental
illness, for those experiencing or at risk of homelessness, and for individuals
facing institutionalization more generally. 92
The application of Olmstead in the context of services for homeless
individuals with mental disabilities again illustrates the potential of rights to
guide approaches to advocacy. 93 Olmstead’s vision of integration—that the
ADA creates an affirmative obligation to move individuals with disabilities
into community-integrated settings—takes norms of equal treatment and
dignity and shapes a variety of day-to-day service decisions. 94 Advocates have
seized upon this vision of Olmstead to promote freedom of choice in services,
emphasizing client involvement in service planning and decision-making. 95
Service providers are accordingly increasingly aware of Olmstead’s broad
implications for integrating individuals with disabilities into mainstream
programs and ensuring, to the extent possible, that such individuals can be
supported to live where and how they wish. 96

Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695 (2001); cf. Robert Tsai, Sacred Visions
of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095, 1109-13 (2005) (discussing the iconic symbolism of
constitutional decision making).
92. See Rachel Rubey, Note, There’s No Place Like Home: Housing for the Most Vulnerable
Individuals with Severe Mental Disabilities, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1733-34 (2002); see also
Patricia E. Kefalas Dudek, Using the Olmstead Decision as an Advocacy Tool for your Clients,
15 WTR NAELA Q. 4 (2002) (describing the potential impact of Olmstead in advocacy for
individuals in long-term care); cf. John T. Pardeck & Paul A. Rollinson, An Exploration of
Violence Among Homeless Women with Emotional Disabilities: Implications for Practice and
Policy, 4 J. SOC. WORK IN DISABILITY & REHAB. 63 (2002) (arguing that Olmstead may force
states to provide services to homeless women with emotional disabilities to respond to the high
incidence of violence among that group).
93. While Olmstead does not provide a clear entitlement to services, it has been cited as a
source for an equality-based argument for such an affirmative right. See Mark C. Weber, Home
and Community-Based Services, Olmstead and Positive Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 289-90 (2004). While Olmstead recognized that the integration
obligation it was outlining was limited by state resources, Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605, some courts
have held that resource constraints alone will not shield public entities from similar ADA claims.
See Dudek, supra note 92, at 6. The “fundamental alteration” defense took on greater salience
after Olmstead as a ground for resisting institutional change. See generally Smith & Calandrillo,
supra note 91.
94. See Cerreto, supra note 89, at 76 (“Perhaps the most fundamental impact of the
Olmstead decision lies in its ability to foster the self-determination of people with disabilities.”).
95. Id. at 76-78; see also Emily Miller et al., The Olmstead Decision and Housing:
Opportunity Knocks, OPENING DOORS, Vol. 12 (Dec. 2000) (discussing housing advocacy based
on Olmstead on behalf of individuals with disabilities, including federal housing planning
requirements).
96. Cf. Miller et al., supra note 95.
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CONCLUSION
Advocates have long taken vital roles in shaping public discourse about
homelessness, securing resources, and, of course, defending the individual
rights of those without shelter. To these on-going and still necessary roles can
be added an additional critical task: influencing the design and implementation
of services for homeless persons. Advocates come to this task with a set of
tools honed over decades of long struggles. These tools can translate the
dignity, autonomy, liberty, and equality norms at the center of rights-based
advocacy into a practical guide through which to shape how providers serve
the homeless. In all of the many settings in which those experiencing or at risk
of homelessness find help, advocates can improve service provision, ultimately
providing another avenue to vindicate the rights of those without shelter.

